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Abstract—The theory of quantum cryptography aims to guar-
antee unconditional information-theoretic security against an
omnipotent eavesdropper. In many practical scenarios, however,
the assumption of an all-powerful adversary is excessive and can
be ded considerably. In this paper we study secret key distillation
across a lossy and noisy quantum wiretap channel between
Alice and Bob, with a separately parameterized realistically
lossy quantum channel to the eavesdropper Eve. We show that
under such restricted eavesdropping, the key rates achievable can
exceed the secret key distillation capacity against an unrestricted
eavesdropper in the quantum wiretap channel. Further, we
show upper bounds on the key rates based on the relative
entropy of entanglement. This simple restricted eavesdropping
model is widely applicable, e.g., to free-space quantum optical
communication, where realistic collection of light by Eve is
limited by the finite size of her optical aperture. Future work
will include calculating bounds on the amount of light Eve can
collect under various realistic scenarios.
Index Terms—Quantum secret key distillation; Restricted
eavesdropping.
I. INTRODUCTION
QUANTUM key distribution (QKD) theoreticallypromises unconditional security in the physical
layer. Bennett and Brassard [1] developed the first QKD
protocol (BB84), whose security is guaranteed by the no-
cloning theorem of quantum mechanics and one-time-pad
encryption [2]. Numerous commercial products are available
today that implement variants of the decoy-state BB84
(DS-BB84) protocol [3] based on polarization qubits encoded
in weak coherent state pulses.
While discrete variable (DV) protocols such as the DS-
BB84 showcase the power of quantum cryptography, the
key rates achievable are low and the systems are difficult
to integrate with existing telecommunication systems. Hence,
nowadays there is a thrust to develop QKD systems that can
overcome these challenges. In this regard, continuous variable
(CV)-QKD schemes, e.g., based on coherent laser light and
heterodyne detection are being viewed as viable solutions [4],
[5].
Traditionally, the security proofs of quantum key distribu-
tion against a wiretapping adversary, an eavesdropper Eve,
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assume that Eve can perform any operation allowed by the
laws of quantum physics on the transmitted light, and has
access to all the light that is lost in transmission. However,
this is not the case in some realistic applications, especially
in free-space communication channel where it is reasonable to
consider a potential Eve who is restricted in her information
collection capabilities.
In this work, we present a secure key rate analysis for a
secret key distillation scheme over a quantum wiretap channel
from a sender Alice to receiver Bob, where the eavesdropper
Eve is restricted to receive only a fraction of the photons lost
in transmission as shown in Fig. 1. As a result, some of the
light is rendered inaccessible to any of the parties involved and
lost to the environment. Such a restriction is widely applicable,
e.g., in optical wireless communication [6], where a realistic
Eve would be limited by the size of the aperture of her
receiver, or be forbidden to collect light from an exclusion
zone around Alice-to-Bob line of sight. We consider both
passive eavesdropping where Eve injects the vacuum state into
the channel, and an instance of active eavesdropping, where
Eve injects a thermal state into the channel. 1 The analysis
would include both direct and reverse reconciliation [8], [9]
as they improve differently under restricted eavesdropping.
Quantum wiretap channel model for 
restricted eavesdropping
Fig. 1. Entanglement-based model for quantum communication over a wiretap
channel of transmissivity η from Alice to Bob under restricted eavesdropping.
Alice prepares an entangled pure state |ψ〉AA′ and sends A′ through the
channel to Bob while retaining A with herself. Bob receives B at the output
of the channel. The restriction on the eavesdropper Eve is modeled by a pure
loss beam splitter of transmissivity κ. Eve is shown to inject a state ρE
′
into the channel to Bob, which could be a vacuum state (passive attack) or
a thermal state (active attack). Then Eve collects E and can perform any
operations allowed by the physics law to eavesdrop. F is considered lost in
the process of Eve’s collecting action and thus inaccessible to any party.
1Note that other possible restrictions on Eve include, e.g., a noisy quantum
memory [7] of finite size and coherence time, and a noisy communication
channel where some of the noise is well characterized and provably of non-
adversarial origin, which does not benefit Eve either. However, in this work,
we focus on the restricted light collection capability of Eve.
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2The main findings of our analysis include the following:
• Invoking the Hashing inequality [10] for secret key distil-
lation over a communication channel with one-way public
discussion, we write down lower bounds on asymptotic
achievable key rates under the restricted eavesdropping
model. We show that these key rates can exceed the direct
transmission capacity of the channel in a traditional un-
restricted eavesdropping model. This implies both higher
key rates as well as longer transmission distances.
• We provide upper bounds on the key rates under the
restriction on Eve based on the relative entropy of en-
tanglement (ER). In the case of the pure loss channel,
the ER upper bound closely matches the achievable rate
with heterodyne detection and reverse reconciliation.
• We present a comparison of a CVQKD protocol based
on Gaussian modulated coherent states and heterodyne
detection, and the DS-BB84 DVQKD protocol based on
polarization encoding of weak coherent states, under both
passive and active restricted eavesdropping models.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections II and III de-
scribe the methods employed in establishing the achievable key
rates and the upper bounds on secret key distillation under re-
stricted eavesdropping. These methods apply to passive as well
as active eavesdropping, and direct and reverse information
reconciliation schemes. In Section IV, we present the results
obtained by applying these methods to the entanglement-
based model for secret key distillation based on the two-
mode squeezed vacuum state and heterodyne detection. In
Section V, we present results comparing achievable key rates
(under the restricted eavesdropping model) in CVQKD with
Gaussian modulated coherent states and heterodyne detection,
and in DS-BB84 protocol. We conclude with a summary in
Section VI.
II. ACHIEVABLE RATES FOR SECRET KEY DISTILLATION
UNDER RESTRICTED EAVESDROPPING
Consider the entanglement-based model for bipartite secret
key distillation shown in Fig. 1, where Alice prepares an
asymptotically large number of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) copies of an entangled pure state ψAA
′
and transmits the A′ systems through a wiretap channel. In
this limit, the optimal attack for an eavesdropper Eve is
known to be a collective attack [11], namely wherein she
performs an identical symbol-by-symbol active attack on each
transmission, resulting in i.i.d. copies of a bipartite state ρAB
being shared between Alice and Bob.
Let us first recall key rate analysis for secret key distillation
against an unrestricted Eve (κ = 1 in Fig. 1).
A. Unrestricted Eve
In traditional security analysis for key distillation over a
quantum wiretap channel, where the eavesdropper Eve is as-
sumed to have access to all the light that is lost in transmission,
she holds the full purification of the state ρAB . In other words,
Eve holds a quantum system E such that the systems A, B and
E are in a pure state |ψ〉ABE satisfying ρAB = TrE(ψABE).
In the case of a thermal noise channel with loss, Eve holds the
purification of both the state ρE
′
she injected into the channel
as well as the output of the channel to Bob, namely a pure
state |ψ〉ABER, R being the purifying system of Eve’s input
ρE
′
. Note that the systems ER in this case can be thought
of as one joint purifying system E. Hence the system E in
subsequent discussion in this section also includes the case of
the thermal noise channel.
When either Alice or Bob performs a measurement, Devetak
and Winter [10] proved an achievable rate (KCQQ) for secret
key distillation from the resulting state with one-way public
classical communication assistance—a result known as the
Hashing inequality. Here CQQ stands for “Classical-Quantum-
Quantum”, indicating that either Alice or Bob has performed a
measurement on her/his quantum system, while the other and
Eve are yet to measure their respective quantum systems. For
example, in a reverse reconciliation scheme, Bob performs
a measurement, while Eve and Alice retain their quantum
systems unmeasured. (Likewise, CCQ stands for “Classical-
Classical-Quantum”, which indicates that both the communi-
cating parties have performed measurements. KCCQ reflects
the corresponding achievable key rate, and will be discussed
in Section V in the context of QKD protocols.)
The Hashing lower bound on the key rate for direct recon-
ciliation, namely when Alice measures system A to give rise
to a classical outcome X that is publicly communicated to
Bob is given by
K→(ρ) ≥ I(X;B)ω − I(X;E)ω. (1)
Here the state ωXBE is
ωXBE =
∫
x
dx p(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρBEx , (2)
and the quantum mutual information quantities I(X;B)ω and
I(X;E)ω are the following Holevo information quantities
I(X;B)ω = H(ρ
B)−
∫
x
dx p(x)H
(
ρBx
)
, (3)
I(X;E)ω = H(ρ
E)−
∫
x
dx p(x)H
(
ρEx
)
, (4)
where H(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy. We also have
ρBx =
∑
|e〉
〈e|ρBEx |e〉, (5)
ρEx =
∑
|b〉
〈b|ρBEx |b〉, (6)
ρB =
∫
x
dx p(x)ρBx , (7)
ρE =
∫
x
dx p(x)ρEx , (8)
where ρBEx is the density matrix of system BE conditioned
on the measurement result X = x. |b〉 and |e〉 each represents
a complete (usually orthonormal) basis of system B and E.
3Since each conditional state |x〉〈x|X⊗ρBEx is a pure state, we
have H
(
ρBx
)
= H
(
ρEx
)
. This leads to
K→ ≥ I(X;B)ω − I(X;E)ω (9)
= H(ρB)−
∫
x
dx p(x)H
(
ρBx
)
−
(
H(ρE)−
∫
x
dx p(x)H
(
ρEx
))
(10)
= H(ρB)−H(ρE) (11)
= H(B)ω −H(E)ω (12)
= H(B)ψ −H(E)ψ (13)
= H(B)ψ −H(AB)ψ (14)
= I(A〉B)ρ, (15)
which is the expression for coherent information [10], [12] of
ρAB . Here Eq. (13) follows from the fact that the marginal
states of systems B and E for the states ω and ψ are the
same. Equation (14) follows from the fact that for a tripartite
pure state ψABE , H(AB)ψ = H(E)ψ .
For reverse reconciliation, similarly, by changing the roles
of Alice and Bob, we arrive at an expression for a Hashing
lower bound on the secret key distillation rate K← given by
K← ≥ I(A;Y )ω − I(Y ;E)ω. (16)
Here the state ωAY E is
ωAY E =
∫
y
dy p(y)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρAEy , (17)
and Y is the classical outcome of measuring Bob’s quantum
system B. Now if ψABE is a pure state, ρAEy is also a pure
state, which gives us H(ρAy ) = H(ρ
E
y ). And similar to the
direct reconciliation case this leads to
K← ≥ I(A;Y )ω − I(Y ;E)ω (18)
= H(ρA)−
∫
y
dy p(y)H
(
ρAy
)
−
(
H(ρE)−
∫
y
dy p(y)H
(
ρEy
))
(19)
= H(ρA)−H(ρE) (20)
= H(A)ω −H(E)ω (21)
= H(A)ψ −H(E)ψ (22)
= H(A)ψ −H(AB)ψ (23)
= IR(A〉B)ρ, (24)
which is the expression for reverse coherent information [13],
[10], [14] of ρAB . Similarly here Eq. (22) follows from the
fact that the marginal states of systems A and E for the states
ω and ψ are the same. Equation (23) follows from the fact that
for a tripartite pure state ψABE , H(AB)ψ = H(E)ψ . And we
also have
ρAy =
∑
|e〉
〈e|ρAEy |e〉, (25)
ρEy =
∑
|a〉
〈a|ρAEy |a〉, (26)
ρA =
∫
y
dy p(y)ρAy , (27)
ρE =
∫
y
dy p(y)ρEy . (28)
B. Restricted Eve
When Eve only has restricted access to the wiretapped light,
i.e., κ < 1 in Fig. 1, she does not have access to the full
purification of the bipartite state ρAB shared between Alice
and Bob. That is, the systems A, B, and E are not in a pure
state anymore. It is rather together with the system F , which
is lost to the environment, that these systems are in a pure
state |ψ〉ABEF .
In the direct reconciliation case after Alice measures system
A into a classical register X , with the tripartite state between
Alice, Bob and Eve being ρABE =
∫
x
dx p(x)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρBEx ,
we have
K→ ≥ I(X;B)ω − I(X;E)ω (29)
= H(ρB)−H(ρE)−
∫
x
dx p(x)
(
H
(
ρBx
)−H (ρEx )) .
(30)
The second term
∫
x
dx p(x)
(
H
(
ρBx
)−H (ρEx )) now does not
vanish. Similarly, in reverse reconciliation case we have
K← ≥ I(A;Y )ω − I(Y ;E)ω (31)
= H(ρA)−H(ρE)−
∫
y
dy p(y)
(
H
(
ρAy
)−H (ρEy )) .
(32)
III. UPPER BOUND FOR SECRET KEY DISTILLATION
UNDER RESTRICTED EAVESDROPPING
In this Section, we recall the relative entropy of entangle-
ment of a channel [15] (ER), which serves as an upper bound
on the entanglement and secret key distillation capacities of
the channel under unrestricted eavesdropping when assisted
by unlimited two-way classical communication assistance be-
tween the communicating parties, and apply it to the restricted
eavesdropping model. (See also [16] for a related definition of
Rains information of a channel, which is relevant specifically
in the context of entanglement distillation.)
Definition 1: The relative entropy of entanglement of a
channel NA′→B is defined as [15]
ER(N ) := sup
φAA′
ER (A;B)ρ , (33)
where
ER(ρ) := inf
σ∈SEP
D(ρ||σ), (34)
4ρAB = NA′→B
(
φAA
′
)
, and D(ρ||σ) is the relative entropy
between states ρ and σ. When the support of ρ contains that
of σ,
D(ρ||σ) := Tr (ρ (log ρ− log σ)) . (35)
While the relative entropy of entanglement is the relative en-
tropy of a state with its closest separable (SEP) state in Hilbert
space, the relative entropy of entanglement of a channel is the
relative entropy of entanglement of the state distributed across
the channel optimized over all possible inputs to the channel.
1) Unrestricted Eve: Using the relative entropy of entangle-
ment, Pirandola et al. (PLOB) [15] gave an upper bound to the
energy-unconstrained, two-way unlimited Local Operations
and Classical Communication (LOCC)-assisted entanglement
and secret key distillation capacity of lossy and noisy bosonic
channels. For a pure loss channel Nη of transmissivity η,
the relative entropy of entanglement upper bound is given
by max{K→,K←} ≤ ER(Nη) = − log2(1 − η). Since this
upper bound matches the reverse coherent information lower
bound [13], [17], the above rate characterizes the capacity.
(See also [18] for a strong converse theorem for the upper
bound.)
For a thermal noise channel Nη,ne of transmissivity η and
thermal noise ne, which is the mean photon number in the
thermal state that Eve injects into the channel, the relative
entropy of entanglement upper bound is known to be [15]
max{K→,K←} ≤ ER(Nη,ne) = log2
(
η
1−η
)
− g (ne),
where [19], [20]
g(x) = (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− x log2(x) (36)
is the von Neumann entropy of a thermal state of mean photon
number x.
The bipartite separable quantum states closest in relative
entropy divergence to a two-mode entangled quantum states
shared across the channel that are required in giving the above
ER bounds are found using the Positive-Partial Transpose
(PPT) criterion for separability of quantum states [21], [22].
2) Restricted Eve: In the restricted eavesdropping model in
Fig. 1, the state of interest now is the tripartite state ρAFB ,
which is purified by the fourth system E that Eve possesses
(unlike the unrestricted case, where system F does not exist
and the state of interest is bipartite). We apply the PPT
criterion across the bipartition AF and B and give relevant
ER upper bounds in this scenario. See Appendix A for details
of the calculation.
IV. ACHIEVABLE RATE AND UPPER BOUND DERIVATION
WITH NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this Section, we apply the methods of secure key rate
(SKR) analysis and upper bounds presented in Secs. II and III
to bosonic pure loss and thermal noise channels fed with an
input two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state |Ψ〉AA′ =
(cosh r)−1
∑∞
n=0(tanh r)
n|n〉|n〉. The achievable rates are
given for heterodyne detection either at Alice or Bob, which
correspond to direct and reverse information reconciliation
scenarios, respectively.
A. Achievable Rates
1) Pure Loss Channel: First we will show the achievable
rate with direct reconciliation, namely where Alice performs
heterodyne detection on her system, as depicted in Fig. 2.
Assuming a TMSV state input, we calculate the achievable
rate for this setup.
𝐴′
𝐴
𝜌𝐸′ = |0⟩⟨0|
𝐸
𝐵
𝐹
M 𝑋
𝜌𝐹′ = |0⟩⟨0|
𝜂
𝜅
Direct reconciliation in 
pure loss channel
𝜓𝐴𝐴
′
(TMSV)
Fig. 2. Entanglement-based model for secret key distillation over a pure loss
bosonic channel based on heterodyne detection and direct reconciliation. Here
Alice performs heterodyne measurement of system A and this projects the
system A′ of the TMSV state ψAA
′
(with µ mean photon number per mode)
onto a coherent state |α〉A′ . She then sends side information in the classical
channel to Bob to help him distill keys from his system. Here vacuum states
are injected from E′ and F ′ denoting a pure loss channel. The restriction on
Eve is imposed by letting only a κ fraction of the wiretapped light reach her
receiver.
Since the heterodyne measurement on A projects the other
part A′ of the TMSV onto a coherent state ρA
′
x = |α〉, we
know that the state at the beam splitters’ outputs conditioned
on measurement result x, namely ρBx , ρ
E
x , ρ
F
x are also coherent
states with attenuated amplitudes. Since they are pure states
we have
H
(
ρBx
)
= H
(
ρEx
)
= 0. (37)
So, using Eq. (30), we have
K→ ≥ H(ρB)−H(ρE) (38)
= g (ηµ)− g (κµ (1− η)) , (39)
where µ = sinh2(r) is the average photon number in the light
Alice transmits to Bob, which leads to
lim
µ→∞K→ ≥ log2
η
κ(1− η) . (40)
Equation (40) [23] gives the limiting value of the key rate
when the input photon number is taken to infinity. This limit
can be shown to be the optimal input strength that maximizes
the key rate. Notice that the dependence of the direct recon-
ciliation achievable rate in Eq. (40) on Eve’s restriction κ is in
the denominator inside the log function. Thus, restricting Eve’s
received power can help increase the achievable rate beyond
the rate achievable against an unrestricted Eve (κ = 1 in
Eq. (40)), namely log2
(
η
1−η
)
. It is interesting to note that the
increase in achievable rate is accomplished without affecting
the channel from Alice to Bob, but rather by modifying the
channel from Alice to Eve.
5In the case of an unrestricted Eve and direct reconciliation,
we need to have η > (1 − η) to attain a positive key rate in
Eq. (40). This gives us η > 0.5 = 3dB which is known as the
”3dB limit” for direct reconciliation where key rate drops to
zero when channel transmissivity is below 3dB. Similarly for
the key rate to be greater than zero in the restricted Eve case,
we need to have η > κ(1 − η), which gives η > κ1+κ . This
condition captures the limitation of direct reconciliation with
regard to the transmission distance, namely that the key rate
vanishes beyond a threshold distance.
𝐴′
𝐴
𝜌𝐸′ = |0⟩⟨0|
𝐸
𝐵
𝐹
M
𝜌𝐹′ = |0⟩⟨0|
𝑌
𝜂
𝜅
Reverse reconciliation in 
pure loss channel
𝜓𝐴𝐴
′
(TMSV)
Fig. 3. Entanglement-based model for secret key distillation over a pure loss
bosonic channel based on heterodyne detection and reverse reconciliation.
Here Bob performs heterodyne measurement on his system B; the states
injected from E′ and F ′ are vacuum states.
Now, consider the case of reverse reconciliation, as depicted
in Fig. 3. Here, Bob performs heterodyne measurement on
his system B and sends side information through a classical
communication channel to Alice to help her distill secret
key. Using Eq. (32), and recognizing that Y is a continuous
variable, we get
K← ≥ H(ρA)−H(ρE)−
∫
y
dy p(y)
(
H
(
ρAy
)−H (ρEy ))
(41)
= g(µ)− g(κµ(1− η))
−
∫
y
dy p(y)
(
g
(
µ(1− η)
1 + ηµ
)
− g
(
(1− η)κµ
1 + ηµ
))
(42)
= g(µ)− g(κµ(1− η))
−
(
g
(
µ(1− η)
1 + ηµ
)
− g
(
(1− η)κµ
1 + ηµ
))
, (43)
and
lim
µ→∞K← ≥ log2
1
κ(1− η) −
(
g
(
1− η
η
)
− g
(
(1− η)κ
η
))
.
(44)
Since in this case the post-measurement conditional states
are not pure, we derived the covariance matrix of correspond-
ing states and calculated the von Neumann entropies, which
turns out as shown in Eq. (42). Since the argument of the h
functions in Eq. (42) have no dependence on the probability
distribution of y, we get Eq. (43) by integrating over y. Taking
the limit of input mean photon number µ→∞, we obtain the
optimal achievable rate given in Eq. (44).
Equation (44), when κ = 1, reduces to − log2(1−η), which
is also the PLOB bound based on ER, discussed in Sec. IV-B,
and hence the capacity. If we compare Eq. (44) for κ < 1
with pure loss unrestricted model capacity − log2(1 − η),
not only do we have κ showing up in the denominator
inside the logarithm, but we also have one correction term:
−(g(µ(1−η)1+ηµ ) − g( (1−η)κµ1+ηµ )). This correction term changes
differently with κ compared to the first term log2(
1
κ(1−η) ).
Unlike the case with the unrestricted Eve, we find that the
achievable rate with reverse reconciliation is not always better
than the rate with direct reconciliation.
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Fig. 4. (a) Secure key rate against restricted eavesdropping over a pure loss
channel with TMSV state and heterodyne detection. Direct reconciliation vs.
reverse reconciliation rates as a function of κ. Here the channel transmissivity
is set to η = 0.6. (b) Direct reconciliation vs. reverse reconciliation achievable
rate as a function of channel loss in dB with κ = 0.1. The channel capacity
against an unrestricted Eve is also shown for comparison.
6In Fig. 4 (a), we plot the SKR as a function of the
restriction on Eve 0 < κ < 1 for a channel transmissivity
of η = 0.6. When high values of κ are assumed, which
includes the unrestricted Eve’s case (κ = 1), we find that
reverse reconciliation gives a higher achievable rate than direct
reconciliation. However when low values of κ are assumed the
rate with direct reconciliation is seen to exceed the rate with
reverse reconciliation.
In Fig. 4 (b), we plot the direct and reverse reconciliation
achievable rates as a function of the channel transmissivity
η for a given value of the restriction on Eve κ = 0.1.
Since channel loss usually increases as transmission distance
increases, we can see that the reverse reconciliation scheme
has a longer useful transmission distance than the direct
reconciliation scheme, which is similar to the case when Eve is
unrestricted as was shown in [13]. However, here both direct
reconciliation and reverse reconciliation can achieve rates that
are higher than the unrestricted Eve’s capacity, which was
achievable with reverse reconciliation.
2) Thermal Noise Channel: For the thermal noise channel,
Eve’s input to the channel is now a thermal state of mean
photon number ne.
Since the thermal state is not a pure state, we need to take
into account its purifying system R. So, here we assume that
Eve holds a TMSV with mean photon number ne. She injects
one mode E′ into the channel while keep the other mode as a
purification and then does a joint operation on systems E and
R.
𝐴′
𝐴
𝐸′
𝐸
𝐵
𝐹
M 𝑋
𝜌𝐹′ = |0⟩⟨0|
Direct reconciliation in 
thermal noise channel 𝑅
𝜂
𝜅
𝜓𝐴𝐴
′
(TMSV)
TMSV
Fig. 5. Entanglement-based model for secret key distillation over a thermal
noise bosonic channel based on heterodyne detection and direct reconciliation.
Here Alice performs heterodyne measurement and sends side information to
Bob to help him distill secret keys. Eve holds a TMSV with ne mean photon
number per mode and injects one of the modes into the channel, actively
inducing noise.
First we look at the case of direct reconciliation, depicted
in Fig. 5. Again using Eq. (30), we have
K→ ≥ I(X;B)ω − I(X;ER)ω (45)
= H(ρB)−H(ρER)−
∫
x
dx p(x)
(
H
(
ρBx
)−H (ρERx ))
(46)
= g(ne(1− η) + ηµ)−
∑
i
g
(
νERi − 1
2
)
− (g(ne(1− η))− (g(ne(1− ηκ)). (47)
Here the state ωXBER is
ωXBER =
∫
x
dx p(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρBERx . (48)
νERi s are the symplectic eigenvalues of the reduced covariance
matrix of modes E and R. Finally, we have
lim
µ→∞K→ ≥ log
η
κ(1− η) − g(ne)
− g(ne(1− η)) + g(ne(1− ηκ)). (49)
Here if we compare Eq. (49) with the direct reconciliation
achievable rate for an unrestricted Eve case over the thermal
noise channel [15] log( η(1−η) )−g(ne), we can see that κ shows
up in the denominator inside the logarithm function in a way
similar to the case of the pure loss channel. However, here we
still have a correction term −g(ne(1 − η)) + g(ne(1 − ηκ)),
which vanishes when κ→ 1.
𝐴′
𝐴
𝐸′
𝐸
𝐵
𝐹
M
𝜌𝐹′ = |0⟩⟨0|
𝑌
Reverse reconciliation in 
thermal noise channel 𝑅
𝜂
𝜅
𝜓𝐴𝐴
′
(TMSV)
TMSV
Fig. 6. Entanglement-based model for secret key distillation over a thermal
noise bosonic channel based on heterodyne detection and reverse reconcilia-
tion. Here Bob performs heterodyne measurement and sends side information
to Alice to help her distill secret keys. Eve holds a TMSV with ne mean
photon number per mode and injects one of the modes into the channel,
actively inducing noise.
Now, for the reverse reconciliation case depicted in Fig. 6,
7we use Eq. (32) to obtain our results
K← ≥ I(A;Y )ω − I(Y ;ER)ω (50)
= H(ρA)−H(ρER)−
∫
y
dy p(y)
(
H
(
ρAy
)−H (ρERy ))
(51)
= g(µ)−
∑
i
g
(
νERi − 1
2
)
− g
(
µ− ηµ(1 + µ)
1 + ne − neη + ηµ
)
+
∑
i
g
(
νERyi − 1
2
)
.
(52)
Here the state ωAY ER is
ωAY ER =
∫
y
dy p(y)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρAERy . (53)
νERi (i = 1, 2) are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covari-
ance matrix corresponding to system ER and νERyi (i = 1, 2)
are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix cor-
responding to the post-measurement system ER|y after the
measurement of Bob’s state B. Finally, we have
lim
µ→∞K← ≥ log
1
κ(1− η) − g(ne)− g
(
1 + ne − neη − η
η
)
+
∑
i
g
(
limµ→∞ νERyi − 1
2
)
. (54)
In Eq. (54) we have κ showing up in the denominator
inside the log function compared to the reverse reconciliation
achievable rate for thermal noise channels under unrestricted
Eve’s case log2
(
1
κ(1−η)
)
− g (ne). Also, we have correction
terms of which the exact form is given below:
lim
µ→∞ν
ER
y1 =
∣∣∣∣A−B + C +Dη
∣∣∣∣ , (55)
lim
µ→∞ν
ER
y2 =
∣∣∣∣−A+B − C +Dη
∣∣∣∣ , (56)
A = η2 (2ne(ne + 1) + 1) , (57)
B = 2ηκ
(
η + 2n2e + ne − 1
)
, (58)
C = 2κ2(−η + ne + 1)2, (59)
D = 2
√
(E − F +G) (−ηκ+ κ+ ne(κ− η))2, (60)
E = η2(−κ+ ne + 1)2, (61)
F = 2ηκ(ne + 1)(κ+ ne − 1), (62)
G = κ2(ne + 1)
2. (63)
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Fig. 7. Achievable rates, direct reconciliation vs. reverse reconciliation, as a
function of input mean photon number µ in the input signal. With different
choices of the channel parameters direct reconciliation can have a higher or
lower rate than reverse reconciliation. In both figures direct and reverse SKR
increase with increasing input power and saturate to some value while different
κ values change the comparison between direct and reverse reconciliation.
With the above results Eqs. (55)-(63), we first plot the direct
and reverse reconciliation achievable rates as functions of the
input mean photon number µ in Fig. 7.
Here in Fig. 7, we can see that the achievable rate for both
direct reconciliation and reverse reconciliation is increasing
with increasing input mean photon number µ. So µ = ∞ is
optimal. Also, depending on the channel parameters, either
direct or reverse reconciliation could have the higher rate.
For the figures below, unless specified otherwise, the achiev-
able rate is plotted with µ taken to infinity.
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Fig. 8. Achievable rate as a function of input mean photon number ne of
thermal noise state with κ = 0.4, η = 0.8, µ =∞.
8Reverse reconciliation
Direct reconciliation
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.05
0.10
0.50
1
5
10
η
SK
R
(bits/
m
od
e)
SKR vs η with ne=1, κ=0.6
Fig. 9. Achievable rate as a function of transmissivity η with κ = 0.6,
ne = 1, µ =∞.
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Fig. 10. Achievable rate as a function of κ with η = 0.7, ne = 1, µ =∞.
In Figs. 8-10, we separately plot the direct and reverse
reconciliation achievable rates as functions of the thermal
noise strength ne, channel transmissivity η, and the restriction
factor κ. We can see that both direct and reverse reconciliation
key rates decrease with increasing noise, increasing κ and
increasing channel loss (−10 log10(η)).
Since reverse reconciliation generally gives us a greater
transmission range than direct reconciliation (see Fig. 9 as
transmissivity η usually decreases with increasing transmission
distance for a given channel), below we show achievable
rates with reverse reconciliation for different parameters. We
also plot the capacity of the pure loss channel against the
unrestricted Eve, − log2(1 − η), for comparison. In Fig. 11,
we show that even though generally with increasing noise
the SKR goes down and tends to have a shorter transmission
distance, with small κ it is still possible to exceed the pure loss
unrestricted Eve’s capacity for some values of channel loss.
Then we fix the noise ne and change κ in Fig. 12. It is shown
that for different values of noise, even when noise is very high,
a small κ can improve the achievable rate dramatically.
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Fig. 11. Achievable rate as a function of channel loss in dB with different
choices of κ.
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Fig. 12. Achievable rate as a function of channel loss in dB with different
values of ne.
9B. Upper Bounds
In this Section we apply the method discussed in Section III
and Appendix A to get upper bounds for secret key distillation
under restricted eavesdropping.
1) Pure Loss Channel: First we look at the pure loss case.
An upper bound on the secret key distillation capacity under
the restricted eavesdropping model considered here follows
from the broadcast channel result [24, Eq. (26)] [25, Eq. (8)]
as:
ER(B;AF )φ = log2
(
1− ηF
1− ηB − ηF
)
. (64)
𝐴′
𝐴
𝜌𝐸′ = |0⟩⟨0|
𝐸
𝐵
𝐹
𝜌𝐹′ = |0⟩⟨0|
𝜓𝐴𝐴′
(TMSV)
1 − 𝜂𝐶
𝜂𝐵
1 − 𝜂𝐶
Broadcast channel
Fig. 13. Broadcast channel shown in [24], [25], where a single sender sends
information to receivers F , E and B through different lossy channels. Here
the signal state is sent out from A′ while only vacuum states are injected from
F ′ and E′. This can be viewed as equivalent to our model if we consider
mode F as an inaccessible system, and E as the eavesdropper Eve.
Here the notation B;AF means that the closest separable
state for the relative entropy entanglement calculation is a state
separating system B from systems AF . In Ref. [24], [25], the
key to obtaining the above bound was the different physical
realizations of the same broadcast channel, one of them being
as shown in Fig. 13. Since only vacuum states are injected
from F ′ and E′ in Fig. 13, it is equivalent to our model in
Fig. 1 with ηB = η and ηC = (1 − κ)(1 − η). Thus, the
upper bound expression for our restricted eavesdropping case
is obtained as
max{K→,K←} ≤ ER(B;AF ) = log2
(
η + κ(1− η)
κ(1− η)
)
.
(65)
In Fig. 14 we apply Eq. (65) to compare the upper bound
with the lower bound for different values of κ. We plot
the relative entropy entanglement upper bound and the lower
bound for three κ values, denoted by different colors. Here the
lower bound is taken as the maximum of direct and reverse
reconciliation rates.
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Fig. 14. Relative entropy of entanglement upper bounds (UB ER) and lower
bounds with different values of thermal noise.
Here we can see that when κ is close to 1, the upper bound
almost matches the lower bound. And they match each other
when κ = 1 which corresponds to the unrestricted case [15].
However when κ decreases the upper bound becomes looser,
but still highly constrain the region in which the capacity for
secret key distillation can lie.
One interesting thing to see from Fig. 14 is that the region
where direct reconciliation gives a higher rate than reverse
reconciliation has a large overlap with the region where the
upper bound and lower bound are closest to each other. For
example, when κ = 0.01 in Fig. 14 the upper bound and
lower bound diverge from each other close to the point where
direct reconciliation starts to give a lower rate than reverse
reconciliation. Another observation from the plot is that when
κ decreases the lower bound tends to decrease slower with
increasing channel loss at least when channel loss is low.
2) Thermal Noise Channel: Next, we look at the thermal
noise channel. We plot the relative entropy of entanglement up-
per bound ER(B;AF ) calculated as described in Appendix A
along with the lower bounds of Eqs. (49) and (54) in Fig. 15.
Here we can see that when noise is introduced into the channel
the upper bound becomes looser compared to the pure loss
channel, which is similar to what was found for unrestricted
eavesdropping [15]. These gaps between our upper bounds
and lower bounds narrow the search region for this problem’s
capacity.
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Fig. 15. Relative entropy of entanglement upper bounds (UB ER) and lower
bounds with different values of κ.
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN CV AND DVQKD UNDER
RESTRICTED EAVESDROPPING
In this Section, we present a comparison between achievable
rates against a restricted Eve for the Gaussian-modulated
CVQKD protocol (with coherent states, heterodyne detec-
tion and reverse reconciliation) and the corresponding lower
bounds for the DV protocol DS-BB84 (KDS-BB84) that are
derived in Appendix B. For better illustration, we also include
the upper bounds from Sec. IV-B.
First we look at the pure loss channel. In Fig. 16, we plot
the CV achievable rate with reverse reconciliation (KCQQ) and
the CV reverse secure key rate when heterodyne detection is
performed on both communication sides (KCCQ), and compare
with KDS-BB84. Here the CCQ case corresponds to actual
CVQKD, where Alice sends Gaussian modulated coherent
states and Bob performs heterodyne detection. For generality,
in a thermal noise channel (when ne = 0 this goes back to
the pure loss channel):
KCCQ ≥ I(X;Y )ω − I(Y ;ER)ω (66)
= H(ρX)−H(ρER)−
∫
y
dy p(y)(H(ρXy )−H(ρERy )),
(67)
the state ωXYER is
ωXYER =
∫
x
∫
y
dx dy p(x)p(y)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρERxy ,
(68)
Here H(ρX) and H(ρxy) = H(p(y|x)) are classical dif-
ferential entropy of corresponding probability distribution and
conditional probability distribution. In Fig. 16, we can see
in the pure loss channel for any value of input power, the
CV reverse reconciliation scheme generally has rates that are
higher than DS-BB84. Also in the analysis of DS-BB84 there
is an optimal input photon number which is why we see the
peak in those green curves whereas the optimal input photon
number in the CV scheme is infinity, and hence the rate keeps
increasing with increasing input photon number.
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Fig. 16. Comparison of achievable rates for secret key distillation from
TMSV state with heterodyne detection and reverse reconciliation vs. DS-
BB84 protocol over a pure loss channel. We choose different values of κ to
show the difference between two protocols. For DS-BB84 (see Appendix B)
we set ηE = κ(1− η) and fL = 1.
Next we look at the thermal noise channel. In Fig. 17, we
can see that both KCQQ and KCCQ increase with increasing µ,
whereas the DV rate first increases then decreases. This shows
us that the optimal input photon number is different between
two schemes. We can also see that although in the pure loss
channel CVQKD always have higher SKR than DS-BB84, in
a thermal noise channel DS-BB84 can have higher rate for
certain channel parameters and input mean photon number.
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Fig. 17. Comparison between SKRs from: 1. Entanglement-based secret
key distillation scheme with heterodyne detection and reverse reconciliation
(CQQ), 2. Gaussian modulation reverse reconciliation CVQKD with hetero-
dyne detection (CCQ), 2. DS-BB84 protocol with similar restricted eaves-
dropping case. Here noise ne = 0.0005. For DS-BB84 (see Appendix B) we
set nd = ne, ηE = κ(1− η) and fL = 1.
However, In practical implementation it is not realistic to
assume that Alice and Bob can extract all I(X;Y ) information
through information reconciliation stage. So here in Fig. 18
we take the reconciliation efficiency β into consideration and
replot the curves from Fig. 17. We can see now for CVQKD
we do have a finite optimal input mean photon number, which
is beneficial for implementation since infinite mean photon
number is impractical. Instead of Eq. (66) we use:
KCCQ ≥ βI(X;Y )ω − I(Y ;ER)ω (69)
= βH(ρX)−H(ρER)
−
∫
y
dy p(y)(βH(ρXy )−H(ρERy )), (70)
the state ωXYER is
ωXYER =
∫
x
∫
y
dx dy p(x)p(y)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρERxy ,
(71)
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Fig. 18. Comparison between SKRs from: 1. Entanglement-based secret
key distillation scheme with heterodyne detection and reverse reconciliation
(CQQ) with reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95, 2. Gaussian modulation
reverse reconciliation CVQKD with heterodyne detection (CCQ) with rec-
onciliation efficiency β = 0.95, 2. DS-BB84 protocol with similar restricted
eavesdropping case with fL = 1.1. (See Eq. (85)) Here noise ne = 0.0005.
For DS-BB84 (see Appendix B) we set nd = ne and ηE = κ(1− η).
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Fig. 19. Comparison between CVQKD SKR and optimized DS-BB84 SKR.
Upper bound and unrestricted Eve’s capacity are given as reference lines.
We also plot the comparison between CVQKD and DS-
12
BB84 in Fig. 19, where the rate of DS-BB84 is optimized over
input photon number. The rate for CVQKD is for optimal, i.e.,
infinite, input photon number (assuming β = 1 and fL = 1).
We also plot the relative entropy of entanglement upper bound
calculated in this paper together with the PLOB lower bound
and upper bound for thermal noise channel [15] for reference.
It shows the comparison between optimized DV and CV rates
with thermal noise ne = 0.5 as a function of the channel
loss (nd = ne). We can see that although generally CVQKD
has a higher rate, it appears that its achievable rate doesn’t
necessarily offer a longer distance. Also it can be shown that
by assuming such restriction we are getting a higher capacity
region.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
In summary, we showed lower bounds (achievable rates) for
secret key distillation under restricted eavesdropping across
pure loss and thermal noise channels based on heterodyne
detection. We showed that putting a reasonable restriction on
Eve can increase the key rate and extend the transmission
range under the same channel conditions. We also showed
that unlike the case in unrestricted eavesdropping model, in
restricted eavesdropping model direct reconciliation has a
potential of providing higher secure key rate under certain
channel parameters. Furthermore, we calculated upper bounds
using the relative entropy of entanglement for both pure loss
and thermal noise channel, and showed that the upper bound is
fairly close to the achievable rates with heterodyne detection,
for pure loss channel even nearly being the capacity under the
restricted eavesdropping model. We also showed a comparison
of achievable rates between Gaussian modulation CVQKD and
DS-BB84 protocol under restricted eavesdropping with perfect
or imperfect reconciliation. All our results capture how the
key rates and the transmission distances can increase with the
assumption of restricted eavesdropping.
One possible avenue for future work is to find the better
detection scheme than heterodyne detection or tighter upper
bounds under restricted eavesdropping.
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATING THE RELATIVE ENTROPY OF
ENTANGLEMENT UPPER BOUND
The covariance matrix V of an N−mode Gaussian state ρ
is the real symmetric matrix defined by
Vij = Tr (ρ{(rˆi − di), (rˆj − dj)}) , (72)
where ”{}” denotes the anticommutator {Aˆ, Bˆ} = AˆBˆ+ BˆAˆ.
rˆ represents the grouped quadrature operators of the N modes
involved
rˆ = (rˆ1, ..., rˆ2N )
T (73)
= (xˆ1, ..., xˆN , pˆ1..., pˆN )
T , (74)
and d denotes the quadrature means
d = Tr (ρrˆ) . (75)
A valid quantum covariance matrix satisfies the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle given by
V − iΩ ≥ 0, (76)
where
Ω =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
⊗ IN×N
Calculating the ER upper bounds for the pure loss and
thermal noise channels involves finding the closest separable
state to the Gaussian entangled state shared across the channel
when one share of a TMSV input is transmitted through
the channel. This is accomplished using the positive partial
transpose (PPT) criterion, which is a necessary and sufficient
condition for separability of 1-vs-n−mode bipartite Gaussian
states [27], [28]. The PPT criterion, for a Gaussian state,
translates into a condition on its covariance matrix [27], [28].
For a two-mode covariance matrix V2, the condition reads
V2 − iΩPT2 ≥ 0, (77)
where ΩPT2 =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
⊗
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. Equation (77) is to
be understood as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle after
one of the two modes has been time reversed, i.e., pˆ → −pˆ
(in this case the second mode), which corresponds to partial
transposition.
For a general entangled two-mode covariance matrix of the
form
VAB =
[
a c1
c1 b
]
⊕
[
a −c2
−c2 b
]
, (78)
the closest separable state can be obtained by writing down a
covariance matrix
V sep2 =
[
a c
c b
]
⊕
[
a −c
−c b
]
, (79)
(where c is an unknown parameter) and determining c using
Eq. (77) for V sep2 . The value of c such that the smallest
eigenvalue of V sep2 − iΩPT2 is zero is found to be [29], [15]
c =
√
(a− 1)(b− 1), (80)
and the covariance matrix V sep2 for the value of c in Eq. (80)
corresponds to a separable quantum state. The relative entropy
between the states corresponding to VAB in Eq. (78) and V
sep
2
in Eq. (79) for c given by Eq. (80), when optimized over the
input mean photon number gives the upper bounds mentioned
in Sec. III against traditional unrestricted eavesdropping [15].
While the closest separable state gives the tightest relative
entropy of entanglement upper bound, a close enough separa-
ble state still gives a valid upper bound. We give an ER upper
bound for the restricted eavesdropping model by extending
the above method. For the three-mode entangled covariance
matrix of the form
VABF =
 a c1 ec1 b f
e f d
⊕
 a −c2 −e−c2 b f
−e f d
 (81)
that we have in the restricted eavesdropping model, we write
down a covariance matrix
V sep3 =
 a c ec b f
e f d
⊕
 a −c −e−c b f
−e f d
 (82)
where c is an unknown parameter and numerically solve for
c such that the smallest eigenvalue of V sep3 − iΩPT3 is zero.
Here,
ΩPT3 =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
⊗
1 0 00 −1 0
0 0 1
 (83)
The relative entropy between the states corresponding to VABF
and V sep3 of Eqs. (81) and (82) optimized over the input mean
photon number is the upper bound we plot in Secs. IV-B and
V. The reason for choosing V sep3 in this form is to simplify
the optimization complexity (with only one variable c to be
solved) and also because we are only concerned with the
separability between modes A and B in the task of distilling
secret key (covariance terms other than the covariance between
mode A and B are thus left unchanged). In above calculation
we are actually studying the separability of mode AF and
B, which is similar to what was discussed in [25] where a
second receiver party (Charlie) in broadcast channel assists the
communication between Alice and Bob. Also the reason for
not considering separating mode A from mode BF is because
that would just be studying a quantum channel with different
transmissivity with no restrictions on Eve.
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APPENDIX B
RESTRICTED EVE SECURE KEY RATE FOR DS-BB84
In this appendix we derive the SKR for DS-BB84 with a
restricted Eve that we used in Sec. V. As a prelude, however,
we reprise a result from [2]—using notation that will be
convenient for what follows—for an unrestricted Eve. In both
cases, the SKRs are asymptotic-regime results for photon-
number splitting attacks. Moreover, for both cases we assume
that Alice and Bob use polarization encoding in which all
four polarization states are equally likely. In particular, Alice
uses a weak coherent-state source that transmits signal-state
pulses—containing µ photons per pulse on average at a rate
R states/s—over an Alice-to-Bob channel with transmissivity
ηc. She also transmits sufficient decoy states to accurately
estimate—in the asymptotic regime—the fraction of her signal
pulses that contain single photons. Bob uses 50–50 active
basis selection and a pair of single-photon detectors each with
quantum efficiency ηq and nd dark counts on average per pulse
interval 1/R.
When Eve is unrestricted, we must assume that she can
interact with all the light Alice sends to Bob. From [2] we
then have that
SKR = max(IAB − IAE , 0) (84)
where IAB is Alice and Bob’s Shannon information (in bits/s)
and IAE is Alice and Eve’s Shannon information (in bits/s).
Alice and Bob’s Shannon information obeys
IAB = RPr(B1){1− fLH2[Pr(Be)]}/2 (85)
where: B1 is the event that Bob gets a total of 1 click from
his two detectors during a signal-pulse interval when Alice and
Bob use the same basis, making Pr(B1) the probability of a
sift event; Be is the sift event in which Bob’s detector click
is from the detector associated with the wrong polarization,
making Pr(Be) the raw-key error probability, a quantity
usually called the quantum bit error rate [30];
H2(p) ≡ −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p), (86)
is the binary entropy function; and fL ≥ 1 is Alice and Bob’s
reconciliation penalty. In words, this formula states that IAB
is the sift rate RPr(B1)/2, i.e., the rate at which Alice and
Bob choose the same basis and Bob gets a total of 1 click
from his detectors, multiplied by Alice and Bob’s Shannon
information per sift event 1− fLH2[Pr(Be)], i.e., the entropy
of Alice’s transmission to Bob minus the information leaked
during reconciliation.
To find Alice and Eve’s Shannon information rate, consider
what happens when Alice transmits an n-photon signal pulse.
When n = 0, Eve gets no information. When n = 1, Eve
gets partial information, but this comes at the expense of her
creating errors. When n ≥ 2, Eve gets complete information
by means of a photon-number splitting attack. Consequently,
Alice and Eve’s Shannon information rate obeys
IAE = RPr(B1){1− Pr(A0 | B1)− Pr(A1 | B1)
× (1−H2[Pr(Be | A1B1)])}/2, (87)
where An is the event that Alice’s signal pulse contains n pho-
tons. Here, IAE equals Alice and Bob’s sift rate RPr(B1)/2
multiplied by the entropy of Alice’s transmission to Bob
reduced by entropies of the sift events associated with Alice’s
transmission of a 0 photon signal pulse and those of the sift
events associated with Alice’s transmission of a 1 photon
signal pulse and Eve’s interaction therewith.
The probabilities necessary to instantiate the preceding
Shannon information expressions are easily found. The prob-
ability of a sift event equals the probability of a click on one
of Bob’s detectors and no click on the other detector:
Pr(B1) = (1− e−(ηµ+nd))e−nd
+ e−(ηµ+nd)(1− e−nd), (88)
where η ≡ ηqηc is the overall Alice-to-Bob transmissivity
(the channel transmissivity times the detector quantum effi-
ciency) and we have used statistically independent Poisson
statistics for the counts generated by each detector. We have
that Pr(A0 | B1) = Pr(A0B1)/Pr(B1), where the joint
probability of Alice sending 0 photons and that transmission’s
resulting in a sift event is
Pr(A0B1) = Pr(A0) Pr(B1 | A0) = 2e−µe−nd(1− e−nd).
(89)
Similarly we have that Pr(A1 | B1) = Pr(A1B1)/Pr(B1),
where the joint probability of Alice sending 1 photon and that
transmission’s resulting in a sift event is
Pr(A1B1) = Pr(A1) Pr(B1 | A1) (90)
= µe−µ[ηe−2nd + (2− η)e−nd(1− e−nd)]. (91)
Bob’s conditional error probability for a sift event, given Alice
sent 1 photon, is thus
Pr(Be | A1B1) = Pr(BeA1B1)/Pr(A1B1) (92)
=
(1− η)e−nd(1− e−nd)
ηe−2nd + (2− η)e−nd(1− e−nd) , (93)
where the numerator is the joint probability that Alice has
transmitted 1 photon, it results in a sift event, and Bob’s
single click comes from the detector associated with the wrong
polarization. Bob’s unconditional error probability for a sift
event is given by
Pr(Be) =
e−(ηµ+nd)(1− e−nd)
(1− e−(ηµ+nd))e−nd + e−(ηµ+nd)(1− e−nd) , (94)
where the numerator is the probability for a sift event in
which Bob’s 1 click comes from the detector associated with
the wrong polarization. Substituting these probabilities into
Eqs. (85), and (87), and then evaluating Eq. (84), gives us
Alice and Bob’s SKR for an unrestricted Eve,
SKR = max{RPr(B1){Pr(A0 | B1)− fLH2[Pr(Be)]
+ Pr(A1 | B1)(1−H2[Pr(Be | A1B1)])}/2, 0}.(95)
Alice and Bob’s SKR can be significantly better when Eve is
restricted, i.e., when she can only interact with a fraction ηE of
the light transmitted by Alice and that fraction is disjoint from
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the ηc fraction that arrives at Bob’s receiver. It follows that
Eve gets no information when Alice’s signal pulse contains 0
photons and she gets complete information about every signal
pulse from which she collects a photon and Bob gets a total
of 1 click from his two detectors. We can now use Eq. (84) to
get Alice and Bob’s SKR, with IAB given by Eqs. (85), (88)
and (94), and IAE given by
IAE = RPr(B1)[1− Pr(E0 | B1)]/2, (96)
where E0 is the event that Eve collects none of Alice’s
photons. Thus we get
SKR = RPr(B1){Pr(E0 | B1)−fLH2[Pr(Be)], 0}/2, (97)
for the DS-BB84 system with a restricted Eve, where
Pr(E0 | B1) = e−ηEµ, (98)
because B1 and E0 are statistically independent events.
Figure 20, obtained using the parameters given in Table I,
illustrates the very significant SKR increase afforded by Eve’s
being restricted in her access to Alice’s transmitted light, i.e.,
when κ ≡ ηE/(1− η) 1.
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Fig. 20. SKRs for unrestricted and restricted Eves plotted versus the average
photon number, µ, of Alice’s signal-state transmissions.
Parameter Symbol Value
Alice’s signal-state transmission rate R 1 Gbit/s
Overall Alice-to-Bob transmissivity η 0.005
Alice’s signal-state average photon number µ see Fig. 20
Alice-to-Eve transmissivity ηE = κ(1− η) see Fig. 20
Average detector dark-count per bit interval nd 10−4
Reconciliation penalty fL 1.1
TABLE I
PARAMETER VALUES USED FOR THE SKR COMPARISON IN FIG. 20
.
